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responsible	 for	 the	 Nagorno	‑Karabakh	 peace	 process,	 whose	 co‑chairs	
include	France	and	the	United	States).	After	the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	Union,	
the	South	Caucasus	became	an area	of	 rivalry	between	Moscow	(which	





















































	• Arguably,	 the	main	 success	of	 the	peace	process	 is	 that	 the	 ceasefire	 in	

































in  1987,	 thereby	remaining	the	oldest	unresolved	conflict	 in	 the	post	‑Soviet	










ing	was	offering	military	 support	 to	both	 sides,	 and	 later	became	 the	most	
important	and	indispensable	intermediary	(even	today,	the	conflict	remains	
the	most	 important	strategic	 instrument	 for	Russia	 in	 the	South	Caucasus).	









































numerous	 risks	of	 existential	 importance	 to	both	Armenia	 and	Azerbaijan.	





years	 since	 its	outbreak	and	 the	period	of	over	25 years	 since	 the	ceasefire.	
The aim	of	 this	publication	 is	 to	describe	 the	characteristics	of	 the	current	
situation	and	the	significance	of	the	conflict	for	its	individual	actors,	as well	
as  to	 outline	 a map	 of	 their	 contemporary	 interests.	Unavoidably,	 the	 text	






flict	has	had	on	both	 states	 and	 its	place	 in	 the	policies	of	 the	other	 states	
in	the	region	and	in	the	more	distant	neighbourhood.	Chapter Four	is	a sum‑
mary	of	the	whole	report	and	an attempt	to	outline	a prognosis	for	the	future.	































I. THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT  








Azerbaijan.	The main	 city	 in	 this	 area,	 and	 the	para	‑state’s	de facto	 capital,	
is	 Stepanakert	 (known	 in	 the	Azerbaijani	 language	 as Khankendi4).	 In  the	






































































be	 stressed	 that	 the	 para	‑state	 is	 closely	 bound	 to	Armenia	 through	 inter‑
personal	contacts,	and	has	 its	own	tools	 to	 informally	 influence	 the	author‑




























ship	of	land,	is primarily a political conflict,	but	another	important	catalyst	
was	the	aversion	that	both	nations	felt	towards	one	another.	This	makes	the	



























































Moscow’s goal when involving itself in the conflict has always been to 












predominant	paradigm	 (the  ‘end	of	history’	 thesis),	 the	West	was	 also	 sup‑
porting	young	statehoods	in	the	name	of	spreading	stability	and	democracy,	























(Armenia	‑Russia,	Azerbaijan	‑Turkey),	 the	 international	 significance	of	 the	
Nagorno	‑Karabakh	conflict	has	in	fact	decreased.	Potentially, however, the 
Nagorno ‑Karabakh conflict is still – also at this level – an important politi‑
cal issue in this part of the world. The zone’s proximity to important war 
theatres and hot spots (Syria and the broader Middle East) as well as its 
shared neighbourhood with Russia, Iran and Turkey and with impor‑
tant transport corridors (from East to West and North to South) means 
that a potential resumption of military activities in Nagorno ‑Karabakh 
would threaten to destabilise several states and cause a crisis that would 
go beyond the regional scale.
When	discussing	Russia’s	 activity	 in	 regards	 to	 the	Nagorno	‑Karabakh	con‑
flict	and	the	engagement	of	other	players,	as well	as analysing	aspects	of	this	
conflict	 such	as  its	 impact	 on	oil	 and	gas	 transportation	or	 the	post	‑Soviet	
integration	processes,	it	seems	justified	to	refer	to	the	matter	with	the	phrase	























ment	of	 the	conflict	needs	 to	 take	 into	account	 the	current,	 internationally	
recognised,	 shape	of	 state	borders	 (which	coincide	with	 the	borders	of	 the	
old	union	republics	in	the	Soviet	Union),	and	no	changes	in	this	regard	can	
be	made.	In response,	the	Armenian	side	argues	that	Azerbaijan’s	territorial	
integrity	does	not	 include	 the	 former	NKAO,	which	actually	proclaimed	 its	
independence	from	Baku	before	the	collapse	of	the	USSR.	From	the	Armenian	
point	of	view,	 the	 fact	 that	 this	decision	was	not	recognised	 in	either	Baku	








thereby	putting	 an  end	 to	Baku’s	 jurisdiction	 over	 the	 former	 autonomous	
oblast.	This	view	 is	not	 shared	by	Azerbaijan.	 In  their	 opinion,	 the	 lack	of	
Baku’s	consent	to	the	referendum	was	of	key	importance;	in	addition,	the	vote	
was	organised	after	the	local	Azerbaijanis	had	been	forced	to	leave	this	area.	
In Baku’s	 view,	 this	 rendered	 the	 referendum	 illegal,	 and	 thus	 it	 could	not	
10	 T. Świętochowski,	Azerbejdżan i Rosja. Kolonializm, islam i narodowość w podzielonym kraju	[Azerbaijan	
and	Russia.	Colonialism,	Islam	and	Nationality	in	a Divided	Country],	Warsaw 1998,	p. 229.
11	 Just	after	 the	collapse	of	 the	Soviet	Union,	 the	 issue	of	 revising	 the	borders	of	 the	 former	union	
republics	was	subject	to	discussion;	however,	a consensus	was	reached	to	recognise	them	automati‑
cally	as borders	of	 the	new	independent	states.	Such	a revision	was	eventually	carried	out –	uni‑














the	arbitrary	decision	of	 the	Soviet	 authorities	 to	 include	a  territory	domi‑
nated	by	Armenians	in	their	republic	did	have	such	an effect).	According	to	













































































III. IN THE SHADOW OF KARABAKH














































ministry of defence stated that during the same period of time (the week of 
24–30 November 2019) the Azerbaijani side had violated the ceasefire on the 
demarcation line “around 220 times” (which translates into an average of just 
over 31 cases per day). On 29 November, an NKR soldier was allegedly badly 
wounded as a result of one of the shootings.16 This situation forces both sides to 
maintain significant defence spending, including the purchase of arms (Azer‑
baijan tends to buy offensive weapons, while Armenia prefers defensive ones) 
and maintain the army in combat readiness, which generates additional costs 
and forces limits on other expenditures.
The degree to which the Nagorno ‑Karabakh conflict impacts current political 
life in Azerbaijan and Armenia was most evident in 2016 during the four ‑day 
war, which led to the earlier ‑mentioned correction in the demarcation line to 
Azerbaijan’s advantage (to read more about the war, see Appendix 1). In Azer‑
baijan this success reinforced President Ilham Aliyev’s position, to the point 
that he could purge the political elite and military forces of people who had 
earlier been regarded as  ‘unremovable’ (they had often held their positions 
since the beginning of the 1990s), and to nominate his wife to the newly cre‑
ated position of First Vice ‑President. Also, the wave of popular enthusiasm 
served to tone down the social unrest that had been sparked by a drastic drop 
in living standards (after a long ‑lasting drop in oil prices). In Armenia, mean‑
while, a profound social crisis broke out. A series of violent acts took place, 
culminating in the takeover of a police station in Yerevan by a group of armed 
radicals. Anti ‑Russian sentiment also increased, as a result of disappointment 
with Moscow’s inability to prevent the escalation of the conflict and the failure 
of Armenian armed forces (even though Russia’s obligations as an ally do not 
cover the Nagorno ‑Karabakh Republic but only Armenia; for more on Russia’s 
role in the conflict, read later in this chapter). The Armenia’s government did 
get the crisis under control, but emerged from it much weaker; two years later, 
this made it easier for the opposition to take power.
In its early stages, the conflict had an even bigger and direct impact on both 
states’ political life. The first two presidents of Azerbaijan, Ayaz Mutallibov 
and Abulfaz Elchibey, lost power as a result of the situation on the frontline 
(in March 1992 and June 1993 respectively; these events will be discussed later 
16 ‘Нагорный Карабах обвинил Азербайджан в  220  обстрелах за неделю’, Kavkazskiy Uzel, 
30 November 2019, www.kavkaz‑uzel.eu. During that period Armenia’s ministry of defence did not 
issue any communiqués regarding the situation on the frontline, while the case of the wounded 






















framework,	as well	 as  individual	 sportsmen	or	 journalists.	These	visits	are	
nonetheless	few	and	far	between.18	As a rule,	Azerbaijan	does	not	allow	ethnic	
Armenians	to	enter	its	territory,	regardless	of	their	citizenship.	Baku	justifies	
this	decision	by	 claiming	 it	has	no	means	 to	guarantee	 them	adequate	pro‑
tection.	Such	persons	are	identified	based	on	their	Armenian	‑sounding	last	
names.19	 Thus,	 in	May  2019	Henrikh	Mkhitaryan,	 a  professional	 footballer	
with	the	London	club	Arsenal,	who	is	an ethnic	Armenian	(and	a citizen	of	
17	 Neither	the	demarcation	line	nor	the	Azerbaijani	‑Armenian	border	outside	the	conflict	zone	can	


















to	Azerbaijan	 should	 take	 these	 circumstances	 into	 account.	The ministry’s	 communiqué	 stated	
that	 on	many	occasions	Russia	had	 told	Azerbaijan	 that	 such	discriminatory	practices	 are	unac‑




























































































convincing	to	 its	society,	while	 the	Armenian	one	 lost	 its	appeal	(the threat	
from	Azerbaijan	proved	real,	but	Armenia’s	government	at	the	time	was	unable	
to	counter it).



































tests	by	pointing	to	an external	 threat:	 it	claims	that	Azerbaijan	could	 take	
advantage	of	any	potential	chaos	 to	attack.	For	example,	 such	rhetoric	was	
used	during	the 2015	protests	which	erupted	in	reaction	to	a huge	hike	in	elec‑








also,	 to	a  lesser	degree,	 to	 convince	 their	 international	partners	 to	 support	
their positions.



















































Kocharyan,	 but	 also	 General	Manvel	 Grigoryan28)	 and	 numerous	 speeches	
25	 Based	 on	 interviews	 carried	 out	 by	 the	 Centre	 for	 Eastern	 Studies	 (OSW)	 in	 Yerevan	 from  9	 to	
























by	 Pashinyan	 himself.	 Aware	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 the	Nagorno	‑Karabakh	
question	to	the	Armenia’s	public,	after	the	elections	Pashinyan	made	his	first	
trip	to	Stepanakert.	However,	in	the	months	that	followed,	he	paid	rela	tively	










minister’s	 passivity,	 in	 January  2019	he	 announced	 a new,	more	pro	‑active	







Republic	was	 held	 in	 the	 para	‑state	 on  12 March  2019.30	The  evolution of 
Pashinyan’s position shows that as long as the Nagorno ‑Karabakh con‑
flict remains unregulated, no Armenian leader (and by analogy his 





























The conflict as a nation- and state -building factor
The Nagorno	‑Karabakh	 conflict	 remains	 an  important	 factor	 in	 state‑	 and	
nation	‑building	 in	both	Armenia	and	Azerbaijan,	playing	a very	 important	









land	where	 large	‑scale	Armenian	settlements	only	began	 in	 the	nineteenth	
century.	The conflict	resulted	in	the	occupation	of	a part	of	Azerbaijani	ter‑
ritory	and	the	forced	expulsion	of	a large	number	of	Azerbaijanis	(the covers	
of	Azerbaijani	history	 textbooks	show	the	dates	of	 the	seizure	of	 its	differ‑




part	 of	Azerbaijan	 only	during	Soviet	 times;	 hence	 its	 return	 to	Armenia’s	


















historically	dominated	by	Armenians.	See	В. Шнирельман,	Войны памяти. Мифы, идентичность 
































































development	of	regional	 transport	networks.	However,	as	 this	 is	a problem	




Below,	only	 the	direct	consequences	 for	Azerbaijan	and	Armenia	are	 listed.	
These	include:
	• Disruption	to	transport	connections	between	the	territory	of	Azerbaijan	
















metal	ores),	higher	 investment	 risks	 (the  threat	of	war	and	destabilisation	
discourages	potential	investors),	lower	credit	rankings	for	both	states	(espe‑
cially	Armenia),40	and	finally	increased defence spending (both states allo‑




















The  consequences	 of	 the	 conflict	 have	 included	 large	migration	 and	demo‑
graphic	changes.	Practically	speaking,	the	entire	Azerbaijani	population,	as	
well	 as	 the	Muslim	Kurds,	 had	 to	 leave	 both	 the	 territory	 of	Armenia	 and	
the	 former	NKAO	together	with	 the	adjoined	 territories	which	came	under	
the	control	of	Armenian	 forces.	While	 the	 former	were	refugees,	 the	 latter	
were	 regarded	 as	 internally	 displaced	 persons	 (formally	 they	 remained	 in	
their	own	country,	as they	had	not	crossed	a border	regarded	as	an inter	‑state	
one).42	All in all, the number of displaced persons in Azerbaijan equalled 
to around 750,000,43 which in 1994 amounted to around 10% of the coun‑












interested	 in	 Nagorno	‑Karabakh	 question	 and	 prevent	 Azerbaijan’s	 public	




43	 Around	186,000	Azerbaijanis	escaped	from	Armenia	 to	Azerbaijan	(according	to	 the  1979	census	
Armenia	was	inhabited	by	over	160,000 Azerbaijanis,	a figure	which	was	trending	upwards	thanks	
to	their	high	birth	rate),	as	did	around	18,000 Muslim	Kurds	and	around	4000 Russians	(together	
around	208,000  people).	All	 in	 all,	 in	 the	years	 1991–94	 the	NKOA	and	 the	 ‘occupied	 territories’	
were	left	by	around	500,000 Azerbaijanis	and	Kurds.	In addition,	Azerbaijan’s	authorities	relocated	
around	30,000 people	from	the	territories	bordering	with	Armenia.	Azerbaijani	officials	usually	
talk	about	one	million	refugees;	 this	 is	an exaggeration,	although	 it	 should	be	remembered	 that	
the	total	number	of	displaced	persons	should	also	include	people	who	were	born	in	new	places	of	
residence	(estimates	based	on	P. Adamczewski,	Górski Karabach w polityce niepodległego Azerbejdżanu	
[Nagorno	‑Karabakh	in	the	Policy	of	Independent	Azerbaijan],	Warsaw 2012,	pp. 198–199).	An over‑
all	 figure	of	 around	 750,000  refugees	 and	 internally	displaced	persons	 is	 also	provided	by	Arif	
Yunusov:	А. Юнусов,	Миграционные процессы в Азербайджане	[Migration	Processes	in	Azerbaijan],	
Baku 2009,	p. 28.
























majority	 of	 them	 immediately	 received	 Armenian	 or	 Russian	 citizenship	




Azerbaijan	where	people	were	relocated	from	areas	near	Armenia).	All in all, 
slightly over 400,000 Armenians underwent forced migration.	In 2012	the	
number	of	registered	refugees	in	Armenia	was	no	greater	than 3000.49
As  a  result of the forced migrations, the historical ties linking both 





baijani	minority	 in	Armenia,	while	 in	Azerbaijan	 there	 are	 no	Armenians	








from 74%	in 2005	to 25%	in 2009	(P. Adamczewski,	Górski Karabach w polityce…,	op. cit.,	pp. 200–202).
47	 Couples	in	Azerbaijani	‑Armenian	mixed	marriages –	which	were	more	often	found	in	Azerbaijan,	
especially	in	Baku,	than	in	Armenia –	would,	as	a rule,	move	to	Russia	or	the	West.
48	 P. Adamczewski,	Górski Karabach w polityce…,	op. cit.,	p. 202.	According	to	the 1989	census		Azerbaijan	





































































and	 future	situation	 in	 the	country,	generally	 ‘war’	was	mentioned	as	such	
by	34%	of	those	surveyed,	and	the	Nagorno	‑Karabakh	conflict	by 16%	(these	

















To a great extent, the Nagorno ‑Karabakh conflict has shaped the current 





























ation	 of	 Crimea	 and	 the	 outbreak	 of	 war	 in	 the	 Donbas)	 it	 was	 the	most	


















The role of the conflict in the disintegration of the Soviet Union
The outbreak	of	the	Nagorno	‑Karabakh	conflict	preceded	the	collapse	of	the	




The most	 important	 initiative	 in	 this	 regard	was	 the	Karabakh	Committee,	
which	was	established	by	a group	of	intellectuals	who	had	the	goal	of	including	
Nagorno	‑Karabakh	into	Soviet	Armenia.	The result	of	the	Kremlin’s	dismissal	


























tory	 (in Armenian	discourse	 it	was	presented	as	a  continuation	of	 the  1915	
mass	murder).	After	that	time,	the	Armenian	national	movement	started	to	



















On  23 August  1990,	 the	Armenian	 Supreme	 Soviet	 proclaimed	 the	Declara‑
tion	of	State	Sovereignty	 (still	 as	part	of	 the	Soviet	Union).62	On  this	basis,	
the Armenian	SSR	became	 the	Republic	 of	Armenia	 (which  –	 according	 to	


























military	 forces.63	 In  its	 next	 step	 towards	 independence,	 on  17 March  1991,	
	Armenia	 boycotted	 the	 all‑Union	 referendum	 on	 the	 future	 of	 the	 Soviet	
Union.	 	Similar	boycotts	were	organised	in	some	other	republics64	(as a rule	




















































Moscow’s policy towards the conflict








In the first phase,	 the	authorities	 in	Moscow,	despite	the	hopes	which	the	
Armenians	invested	in	them,69	opposed	any	change	to	the	republic’s	borders,	
and	effectively	supported	Azerbaijan.	This	was,	 first	of	all,	 caused	by	 their	
fear	of	 setting	a precedent	which	could	encourage	more	nations	 to	put	 for‑
ward	their	own	demands,	leading	to	a chain	reaction	which	could	be	hard	to	
halt.	Secondly,	Moscow	hoped	that	 it	would	stop	the	centrifugal	tendencies	
within	 these	 two	 republics	 in	 this	 way.	 Based	 on	 these	 calculations,	 Azer‑







that	 thanks	 to	 the	 conflict	 and	 its	 effective	management	 it	 could	 influence	
confirming	that,	together	with	the	creation	of	the	CIS,	the	Soviet	Union	had	ceased	to	exist	as	a state	
and	a subject	of	international	law.
69	 During	 the	mass	 demonstrations	 in	 Yerevan	 in	 February  1988,	 one	 could	 hear	 such	 slogans	 as	
“Lenin,	Party,	Gorbachev!”	and	“We	trust	 in	Gorbachev’s	words!”	 (A. Balayan,	 ‘Polityczne	 transfor‑























































74	 Data	 from	a report	 issued	by	Memorial,	which	 is	available	at	Сумгаит.инфо,	www.sumgait.info.	
During	this	operation	the	population	of	two	other	Armenian	‑inhabited	villages	were	also	expelled,	
even	 though	 they	 were	 located	 outside	 the	 area	 where	 the	 operation	 was	 being	 implemented.	
On 5 May 1991	the	chairman	of	the	Armenian	Supreme	Soviet,	Levon	Ter	‑Petrosyan,	claimed	that	
the	USSR	had	declared	war	on	Armenia,	 and	on  17 May	a  resolution	was	passed	during	a  closed	
session	of	the	Supreme	Soviet	stating	that	the	methods	used	by	the	Soviet	and	Azerbaijani	divisions	
in Operation	‘Ring’	bore	all	the	hallmarks	of	genocide.


























side	 in	 the	Nagorno	‑Karabakh	war,	which	characterised	 the	second phase 
of Moscow’s engagement in the conflict,	was	the	fall	of	Mutallibov	and	the	
rise	 to	 power	 of	 the	Azerbaijani	 Popular	 Front	 (APF).	Mutallibov	 resigned	
on 6 March 1992	as	a result	of	 the	 failures	on	the	Nagorno	‑Karabakh	front.	













76	 T. de Waal,	Black Garden. Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War,	New	York	University	Press,	
New	York	and	London 2003,	pp. 90–91.
















































80	 In practice,	Russia	equipped	 the	NKR	army.	 ‘Современное	состояние	ПВО	стран –	бывших	со‑
ветских	союзных	республик.	Часть 6‑я’,	Военное	обозрение,	14 October 2016,	www.topwar.ru.	
In the	last	months	of	the	war	the	Armenians	were	using	modern	Russian	Shturm‑S	anti	‑tank	mis‑
sile	 systems.	See	 the	OSW	report,	Konflikty zbrojne na terenie państw WNP, w których rozwiązywa‑
niu uczestniczą instytucje międzynarodowe (ONZ, OBWE)	[Armed	Conflicts	on	the	Territories	of	CIS	

















The  third phase of the Russian engagement in the Nagorno ‑Karabakh 
conflict, which has lasted until today,	began	with	the	signing	of	the 1994	





important.	 It  should	be	 remembered	 that	despite	 first	 siding	with	Azerbai‑
jan	and	then	the	Armenians,	Moscow	had	already	undertaken	intermediary	
	activities	before	then.	From	the	outset	it	also	actively	participated	in	the	work	







relations	with	both	 sides	of	 the	 conflict	 (Armenia	 is	 a  ‘strategic	ally’	while	








82	 These	political	 instruments	 include	 the	 following:	 control	of	 the	post	‑Soviet	 integration	 formats	
that Armenia	has	 joined,	 as	well	 as	 the	provision	 included	 in	 the  2018 Convention	 on	 the	 Legal	
Status	of	the	Caspian	Sea	which	forbids	the	presence	in	Caspian	waters	of	military	forces	of	non‑
‑littoral	 states.	Russia’s	military	 instruments,	 in	 turn,	 include	 its	military	bases	 in	Armenia	and	




















































































As  part	 of	 the	 so‑called	 shuttle	 diplomacy	 taking	 place	 at	 the	 time,	 Prime	
Minister	Medvedev	and	Deputy	Prime	Minister	Dmitri	Rogozin,	who	accom‑

















that	 a  considerable	 share	 of	 Armenians	 in	 Armenia	 have	 a  rather	 ambiguous	 image	 of	 Russia.	

























their	comprehensive	dependence	on	Russia	 limited	 the	development	of	 the	

















For	Azerbaijan,	 the	 strategic	alliance	 it	has	established	with	Turkey	serves	
as a kind	of	counterbalance	to	relations	with	Russia.
Moscow’s	goal	 is	 to	 include	 the	entire	South	Caucasus –	with	Azerbaijan	 in	

























the	admission	of	a new	state	 into	 the	EAEU	requires	 the	consent	of	all	 the	
existing	members –	and	Armenia	could	veto	Azerbaijan’s	membership –	the	
option	 of	 participation	 in	 the	 organisation’s	work	 as	 an  observer	‑state	was	
introduced	(Moldova	has	been	granted	this	status).
The conflict’s impact on political relations in the South Caucasus
The  Nagorno	‑Karabakh	 conflict	 has	 affected	 not	 only	 the	 states	 directly	
involved,	but	also	Georgia,	the	third	state	in	the	region.	Tbilisi	and	Baku	have	







































































96	 Statement	 from	 a  press	 interview	 in	 October  2013;	 ‘При	 возобновлении	 военного	 конфликта	
в Нагорном	Карабахе	102‑я	база	может	вмешаться –	Командир’,	1news.az,	31 October 2013.
97	 The  estimated	 lengths	 of	Armenia’s	 borders	 are:	with	 Iran	 around	 35  km,	with	Georgia	 around	

















limits	 its	 participation	 in	 regional	 and	 international	 economic	 trade.	 This	













































































































































nature.	 Among	 the	most	 interesting	 ones	was	 a  Russian	‑language	 literary	
almanac	titled	Южный Кавказ	(Southern	Caucasus),	which	gathered	authors	
from	all	 three	 states	as	well	 as	 the	 three	para	‑states	 that	are	 in	 the	 region.	
Altogether,	three	issues	of	the	journal	were	published.105


















initiatives.	 In  spring  1992,	 Armenian	‑Azerbaijani	 negotiations	 took	 place	






































































Iran,	which	at	 first	 glance	might	 look	 like	a paradox:	 a  state	with	a Shi’ite	



















then	predominant	 belief	 in	 the	 ‘end	 of	 history’	 narrative	 and	 final	 victory	
of	 liberal	democracy,	the	West	felt	obliged	to	provide	the	young	post	‑Soviet	
states	with	adequate	assistance	to	ensure	that	stability	and	democratic	rule	
would	 expand	worldwide.	 To  reconcile	 these	motivations	Western	 govern‑
ments	supported	the	idea	of	building	an oil	pipeline	from	Azerbaijan	to	Tur‑






States.110	 Its	passing	 showed	 that	 the	 course	of	 the	Nagorno	‑Karabakh	con‑
flict	has	been	influenced	not	 just	by	Baku	and	Yerevan,	as	well	as	Moscow,	
109	 J. Wróbel,	‘Nagorno	‑Karabakh’	in:	Armed conflicts in the post ‑soviet region. Present situation. Prospects 
for settlement. Consequences,	OSW,	Warsaw 2003,	p. 27,	www.osw.waw.pl.









































































(meetings	 between	 the	 presidents	 of	 Russia,	 Armenia	 and	Azerbaijan,	 see	
Appendix 2),	taking	the	initiative	in	the	resolution	of	the	conflict	on	a perma‑
nent	basis.








OSCE	Minsk	Group),	which	 tacitly	 agreed	 that	Russia’s	 engagement	would	
ensure	peace	and	stability	in	the	conflict	zone.
The pushing	of	the	Nagorno	‑Karabakh	issue	onto	the	backburner	of	the	inter‑
















































is	not	 ideal	 for	 either	 side.	 It  is	 least	 favourable	 to	Azerbaijan,	which	does	
not	consent	to	the	de facto	loss	of	control	over	a part	of	its	territory.	The inci‑
dents	Baku	has	initiated	are,	on	the	one	hand,	an expression	of	frustration,	
and	 on	 the	 other	hand,	 a way	 of	 putting	pressure	 on	Armenia	 and	 the	un‑
recognised	Nagorno	‑Karabakh	 Republic.	 Finally	 and	 thirdly,	 it  is	 a way	 of	
drawing	international	attention	to	the	conflict	and	keeping	this	issue	on	the	
current	political	agenda.	Armenia	is	also	not	fully	content	with	the	status quo.	
















In  the	 case	of	Baku	and	Yerevan,	 resolving	 the	 conflict	 to	 their	 advantage,	



















1. A  disturbance	 of	 the	 balance	 between	 the	 parties	 to	 the	 conflict	 sides	



































to	be	the	most	realistic,	and	the	third	one	the	least.	All in all, indicates that 
over the coming few years, the Nagorno ‑Karabakh conflict will remain 
a permanent element of political landscape in the South Caucasus and 
a necessary point of reference for all actors who are active in this region.





























stituted	89.1% of	 the	population,	and	Azerbaijanis  10%).	However,	 the	Paris	
Peace	Conference	assigned	the	province	to	Azerbaijan.
The Bolsheviks	also	 included	Nagorno	‑Karabakh	 in	Azerbaijan,	with	which	


























































of	 the	growing	crisis),	while	 in	early  1989	Moscow	took	direct	control	over	
















the	republic’s	Supreme	Soviet	passed	a  law	on	 the	unification	of	 the	Arme‑
nian	SSR	and	the	NKAO,	while	on 10  January 1990	it	passed	another	includ‑
ing	the	oblast	into	the	republic’s	budget	and	granting	its	inhabitants	the	right	
















‑Karabakh	Republic,	which	would	 include	 the	whole	 territory	of	 the	 oblast	
and	 the	Shaumyan	district	of	 the	Azerbaijan	SSR.	At  that	 time	 this	district	











































































In December  1993	Azerbaijani	 began	 another	 offensive.	 The  country’s	 new	






the	Azerbaijanis,	 and	 the	authorities	 in	Baku	 feared	 that	 the	 enemy	would	
attempt	 an  attack	 on	Ganja,	which	would	have	 posed	 a  threat	 to	 the	 exist‑
ence	of	their	state,	Aliyev	decided	to	start	negotiations	which	were	organised	
with	the	mediation	of	Russia,	the	CIS	and	the	CSCE	Minsk	Group	(which	later	






source.	According to estimates which most researchers regard as reliable, 
in the period from 1988 to 1994 up to 11,000 Azerbaijanis and 6000 Arme‑
nians were killed in total,	and	30,000 Azerbaijanis	and	20,000 Armenians	
were	wounded.	A few	thousand	people	on	both	sides	went	missing.
The overall number of Azerbaijanis who were forced to leave their homes 
was estimated at around 750,000	 (this	group	also	includes	the	Kurds;	the	
authorities	in	Baku	usually	round	up	the	number	to	one	million),	while for 
the Armenians the figure is estimated at around 400,000	 (see	the	main	
text	of	this	report).





























It was,	 however,	 a  low	‑intensity	 conflict,	 especially	 in	 the	 first	 years	 after	
the	war	when	both	states	were	building	their	state	structures	and	recovering	
from	the	destruction.	This	period	was	characterised	by	a lively	peace	process	











































In November  2007	 the	OSCE	Minsk	Group	presented	 a  proposal	 to	 resolve	
the	conflict.	Its	main	assumptions	are	still	valid	today	(these	are	the	so‑called	
Madrid	 Principles,	 see	 Appendix  2).	 After	 the	 Georgian	‑Russian	 war	 in	
August 2008,	Russia	started	to	take	the	initiative	in	the	peace	process.	It pro‑









In  August  2012	 Safarov,	who	 had	 been	 sentenced	 to	 life	 imprisonment	 in	





























months	of  2016	 there	were	already	 several	hundred	 such	accusations	daily.	
The introduction	of	a mechanism	of	ceasefire	control	proposed	by	the	United	
States	was	blocked	by	Russia,	which	did	not	want	 to	 lose	 its	 initiative	 and	
allow for	a greater	American	presence	in	the	region.
The four ‑day war (2–5 April 2016)
On 2 April 2016	violent	clashes	broke	out.	The Azerbaijani	army	undertook	
an offensive	on	the	territories	occupied	by	Armenian	forces,	attacking	them	
from	 two	 directions,	 northeast	 and	 southeast.	 Baku	 claimed	 that	 it	was	 in	














sified	 its	activities	 to	settle	 the	conflict	on	 its	own	terms	(the  ‘Lavrov	plan’,	
which	included	the	proposed	introduction	of	Russian	peacekeepers:	see	the	
main	text	of	this	report	and	Appendix 2).	After	having	succeeded	in	halting	






















ing	 between	Aliyev	 and	 Pashinyan	 in	Dushanbe	 in	 September  2018,	 it	was	
agreed	that	both	sides	would	work	together	to	prevent	any	further	incidents	
(see Appendix 2).	However,	after	a few	months	of	almost	complete	peace,	new	
































as	a  consequence	 (see	 the	main	 text	of	 this	 report);114	 thus,	any	attempt	 to	





The framework for conflict resolution. The Madrid Principles
The OSCE	Minsk	Group	and	both	states	agree	that	any	settlement	of	the	con‑
flict	has	to	be	based	on	the	principles	included	in	the	Helsinki	Final	Act	(espe‑





see	the	report	by	the	OSCE	special	mission	of 28 February 2005:	Report of the OSCE Fact ‑Finding Mis‑

















These are as follows:
 • The return of the territories surrounding Nagorno ‑Karabakh (the ‘occupied 
territories’) to the control of Azerbaijan;
 • An interim status for Nagorno ‑Karabakh, providing guarantees of security 
and self ‑governance;
 • A corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno ‑Karabakh;
 • Future determination of the final legal status of Nagorno ‑Karabakh through 
a legally binding expression of will (i.e. a referendum);
 • The right of all internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their 
former places of residence;
 • International security guarantees (including  – it  is assumed  – a  future 
peacekeeping operation).
The first, unpublicised version of these principles was presented to the parties 
to the conflict by representatives of the Minsk Group at a meeting on 29 Novem‑
ber 2007 in Madrid. The above ‑mentioned elements were announced for the 
first time in their current version in a shared statement by the presidents of 
France, Russia, and the United States (i.e. the co‑chairs of the Minsk Group) 
issued on 10 July 2009 at the G8 Summit in L’Aquila.117 Since then the Madrid 
Principles have been referenced as a basis for resolving the conflict on many 
occasions by both the co‑chairs of the Minsk Group (for example in the press 
release on 9 March 2019)118 and representatives of other international organ‑
isations, including the European Union, but also (although usually in a more 
general way) by the authorities in Armenia and Azerbaijan.
117 Statement by the OSCE Minsk Group Co‑Chair countries, The Organisation for Security and Co ‑oper‑
ation in Europe, 10 July 2009, www.osce.org. Representatives of Armenia and Azerbaijan have inde‑
pendently repeated on many occasions that overall they agree with the Madrid Principles and accept 
them (of course this does not exclude the differences that exist between them in regards to more 
detailed issues). Baku readily refers to documents from the OSCE Lisbon Summit which took place 
in December 1996, and which recommended Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity as the principle for 
resolving the conflict (Nagorno ‑Karabakh’s self ‑determination was to take place within its borders). 
Armenia kept its distance from these stipulations. Лиссабонский документ 1996 года, The Organi‑
sation for Security and Co‑operation in Europe, 3 December 1996, www.osce.org.
118 Press Statement by the Co‑Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group on the Upcoming Meeting of President 































The main	obstacle	 to	 implementing	 the	Madrid	Principles	 (and	 setting	up	






































































parliamentary	Assembly,	 the	Russian	Federal	Assembly,	 the	Russian	MFA	and	 the	parliament	of	
Kyrgyzstan.	The real	driving	force	for	this	meeting	came	from	Russian	diplomats	who	were	work‑































on,	with	 three	 permanent	 co‑chairs:	 France,	 Russia	 and	 the	United	 States.	
These	states	are	currently	(February 2020)	represented	by	Stéphane	Visconti,	
Igor	Popov	and	Andrew	Schofer.
The greatest achievement of the Minsk Group is the formulation of the 
principles for resolving the conflict which have been accepted by Baku 
and Yerevan.	The group	has	also	managed	to	develop	an effective	mediation	
mechanism –	under	 the	aegis	of	 the	co‑chairs,	 summits	between	 the	heads	
of	Armenia	and	Azerbaijan	are	held	(meetings	at	a lower	level,	 including	at	
the	foreign	minister	level,	are	also	organised).	It has	also	created	a platform	







125	 At  this	summit	 the	decision	was	made	to	create	 the	OSCE,	which	started	 its	activities	on 1  Janu‑
ary 1995.
















Independent initiatives by the Minsk Group Co‑chairs
a) Russia
In the early phase of the conflict, which took place in what was still the 







































In the	following	years,	Moscow made two attempts to resolve the  conflict 
independently,	 each	 time	using	 its	mandate	 as	 the	 co‑chair	 of	 the	Minsk	
Group	 and	 stressing	 the	 leading	 role	 of	 the	 Group	 in	 the	 peace	 process.	
The first initiative took place in autumn 2008,	shortly	after	the	Russian‑
‑Georgian	war.	On 2 November	in	Barvikha,	near	Moscow,	Presidents	Medve‑
dev,	Aliyev	and	Sargsyan	signed	a declaration	in	which	they	expressed	their	
readiness	 to	resolve	 the	conflict	by	peaceful	means,	based	on	 the	rules	and	
norms	of	international	law	(references	were	also	made	to	the	Madrid	Princi‑
ples).	This	was	the	first	document	since	the 1994	ceasefire	to	be	signed	jointly	


















Armenia	 and	Azerbaijan),	 although	 they	 brought	 no	 tangible	 results;	 how‑
ever,	after	the	June 2011	meeting	in	Kazan,	the	parties	stated	that	progress	had	
been	made	towards	an agreement	on	 individual	elements	of	 the	regulation.	
It  turned	out	 that	Moscow	was	unable	 to	overcome	the	aversion	that	exists	
between	both	sides	to	obtain	some	mutual	concessions,	or	to	impose	its	own	
will	on	them.
Moscow’s second independent attempt to resolve the conflict took place 















conviction that this time its instruments would allow it to impose its agenda 
on the peace process could be seen in the intensive ‘shuttle diplomacy’ con‑
ducted by Prime Minister Medvedev and the Foreign Minister Lavrov, who vis‑
ited the region and held a series of meetings with representatives of Armenia 
and Azerbaijan’s governments in Moscow.129 More evidence of Russia’s deter‑
mination to control the process could be seen in Medvedev’s declaration that 
Moscow’s goal was to “finally” settle the conflict, and that Russia is a “natural” 
intermediary because of its close ties and strategic relations with both states. 
Again, no peace plan was announced on this occasion, but should there be one 
in the future, it would certainly not go beyond the Madrid Principles, with 
Baku regaining control over the ‘occupied territories’ and security guarantees 
for the unrecognised Nagorno ‑Karabakh Republic130 (these elements, together 
with the unblocking of transport routes and deploying Russian peacekeeping 
forces in the conflict zone – possibly as a formal CIS mission – were referred 
to in journalistic reports and analytic discourse as the ‘Lavrov plan’). How‑
ever the attempt to ‘force the sides to peace’ failed once again; on this occa‑
sion, the main reason could have been the resistance it faced from Armenia’s 
authorities and society (a part of Armenian public opinion blamed Moscow for 
its territorial losses in the four ‑day war). It is possible that Moscow came to 
the conclusion that imposing concrete solutions on the parties, including the 
presence of Russian peacekeeping forces, would have been too high a political 
cost to bear.131
Both in 2008–09 and in 2016 the Minsk Group supported Russian mediation, 
even though this enforced Moscow’s position at the cost of the other co‑chairs 
(the 2008–09 attempt allowed Russia to take the initiative in the peace process, 
and that of 2016 made it the main mediator and essential participant in the con‑
flict settlement process). This strengthening of Russia’s position was connected 
to the above ‑mentioned change in the priorities of the West, which was becom‑
ing less interested in the region (see the main text of this report), and which in 
time informally recognised it as an area of Russian responsibility. In this new 
context, the positions of Russia and the West – including the United States – 
towards the conflict converged: the interest of both Moscow and Washington 
129 In addition, a trilateral summit took place in St Petersburg on 20 June 2016 gathering the three pres‑
idents, Putin, Aliyev and Sargsyan. It confirmed the decisions of the Vienna Summit of 16 May 2016 
(see the next parts of this appendix).
130 W. Górecki, Nagorno­‑Karabakh…, op.­cit.
131 In  January  2015 a  soldier stationed at a military base in Gyumri murdered an Armenian family, 
which generated stormy protests throughout the country. M. Falkowski, ‘Protests in Armenia as 












lay, first and foremost, in maintaining a stable situation and preventing any 
possible escalation of the tensions. In this situation, it should be acknowl-
edged that the ‘Lavrov plan’ is still in place today, and should the right 
moment come, Moscow will make another attempt to implement it.
b) The United States
The United States’ most intensive activity as an  intermediary in the 
conflict settlement process took place at the turn of this century. 
On 27 April 1999 the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, with the active 
participation of President Bill Clinton, orchestrated the first summit between 
the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan (at that time Robert Kocharyan and 
Heydar Aliyev). It took place in Washington DC and coincided with the cele‑
brations of NATO’s fiftieth anniversary. At the US’s initiative, both presidents 
met several more times, in Geneva and Davos among other locations.  However, 
their most important meeting, in which Secretary of State Colin  Powell par‑
ticipated (the United States was then acting as a co‑chair of the Minsk Group) 
took place in early April 2001 in Key West, Florida. The proceedings of this 
meeting were kept secret. However, based on leaks, it is known that the discus‑
sions included a plan to create a self ‑governing political body out of Nagorno‑
‑Karabakh and the Lachin corridor which would operate under the protec‑
torate of France, Russia and the United States (the ‘occupied territories’ were 
to return to Baku’s control). The project was also intended to plan for the un‑
blocking of the transportation routes, including the railway connection be‑
tween the main part of Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan. In addition, the issues of 
Iran’s participation in the peace process and the possibility of allowing a dele‑
gation from the Nagorno ‑Karabakh Republic to the talks were discussed during 
the summit. Despite some hope of a breakthrough (the co‑chairs of the Minsk 
Group talked about ‘significant progress’) and the initial announcement, the 
next summit, during which the discussions on the plan presented above were 
to have been continued, did not take place. There was also a 16‑month break 
in meetings between the presidents. The most probable reason for this failure 
was the fear of both presidents – especially Kocharyan – that any concessions 
announced would threaten their power (the Key West Summit was criticised 
by the opposition in Armenia).
The US’s engagement in the conflict’s settlement at that time appeared to be 
driven by a desire to assist newly independent states and spread the ideas of 
peace and democracy among them, as well as a result of lobbying by the energy 




























were	 convened	under	 the	 aegis	 of	 the	OSCE	Minsk	Group.132	 The  dialogue	
between	the	leaders	helped	to	reduce	tensions	in	the	conflict	zone	and	main‑
tain	 the	peace	process	at	different	 time	periods.	However,	 it	has	not	 led	 to	
either	even	a partial	breakthrough,	or	at	least	any	visible	progress	towards	the	
settlement	of	the	conflict.	President	Ilham	Aliyev	met	with	Robert		Kocharyan	








	• 16 May 2016,	 in	Vienna	after	 the	 four	‑day	war.	During	 this	meeting	 the	
presidents	 agreed	 to	 unconditionally	 fulfil	 the  1994	 and  1995	 ceasefire	
agreements,	to	monitor	incidents	and	implement	a mechanism	for	their	
132	 All	 in	all,	H. Aliyev	and	Kocharyan	met	over	20  times.	 In 2002	 the	presidents	assigned	their	per‑
sonal	representatives	for	the	conflict	(this	role	was	given	to	the	deputy	ministers	of	foreign	affairs	














	• 16 October  2017,	 in	Geneva.	 The  presidents	 agreed	 to	 take	measures	 to	
decrease	tensions	along	the	demarcation	line.
The  first	 encounter	between	 Ilham	Aliyev	 and	Nikol	Pashinyan,	who	after	
the ‘velvet	revolution’	of	spring 2018	became	Armenia’s	prime	minister,	now	
the	 top	position	 in	 the	country’s	 reformed	political	 system,	 took	place	dur‑
ing	the	CIS	Summit	in	Dushanbe	on 28 September 2018.	At that	meeting	the	
politi	cians	agreed	to	establish	a channel	of	communication	between	them,	and	

























































in	 January 2016,	 in	connection	to	 its	 increased	regional	ambitions	after	the	


























established	 office;	 from  1995	 to  1996	 he	 represented	 Finland	 in	 the	Minsk	
Group).	At present,	 the	European	Union	 is	 financing	a  large	project	of	 five	
European	non	‑governmental	organisations	called	the	European	Partnership	
for	the	Peaceful	Settlement	of	the	Conflict	over	Nagorno	‑Karabakh	(EPNK).136	
The  budget	 for	 its	 third	 stage,	 which	 lasted	 from	May  2016	 to	 April  2019,	
amounted	to	over	€4.7 million.






were	 prepared	 by	 the	Parliamentary Assembly of the Organisation for 
Security and Co‑operation in Europe	(Göran	Lennmarker’s	report)	and	the	








	• the Paul Goble plan,	 which	 was	 premised	 on	 an  exchange	 of	 territo‑
ries	(Armenia	was	to	receive	the	Lachin	corridor	and	a connection	with	
Nagorno	‑Karabakh,	 while	 Azerbaijan	 would	 get	 the	 corridor	 running	
through	Zangezur	in	Armenia,	and	thereby	a land	connection	with	Nakh‑
chivan;	Armenia	would	thus	have	lost	its	border	with	Iran,	see	Map);

















From	Baku’s	 perspective,	 the	 best	 option	was	 to	 keep	Nagorno	‑Karabakh  –	
within	 the	borders	 of	 the	 former	NKAO –	 as	 an  autonomous	 entity	within	
Azerbaijan	(with	‘the	highest	possible	status’	declared	for it);	while	from	that	


























The  four ‑day war which took place in April  2016 showed that at the 
moment neither side is able to resolve this conflict militarily to its advan‑
tage. First and foremost, the military potential has been shown to be of 
less significance than the political situation, at least for the moment.	
It should	be	assumed	that	Russia	would	not	allow	Armenia	to	fail,	and	it	would	
most	likely	intervene	early	enough	to	prevent	that,	if	such	a need	arose:	prob‑
ably	 at	 the	 first	 stage	 of	 any	 hypothetical	war.	 In  turn,	 should	 an  existen‑
tial	 threat	 to	Azerbaijan	arise,	 it  is	possible	 that	Turkey	would	 intervene.138	
	Secondly, the difference in the two warring parties’ potentials is not yet 
large enough to assure a military victory for either army.	 Indeed,	 the	




tain	range	to	a  large	extent,	while	 in	the	east	 it	resembles	a straight	 line	in	
long	sections),	while	Azerbaijan’s	forces	would	have	to	fight	for	them.	In addi‑
tion,	Armenia	is	a formal	member	of	a defence	alliance	(the Collective	Security	
137	 The  data	 cited	 in	 this	 Appendix	 comes	mainly	 from	 the	Military Balance  2019	 report,	 The  Inter‑
national	 Institute	 for	Strategic	Studies,	Routledge,	pp.  185–187	 (referred	 to	 in	 this	 report	 as	MB),	
and  the	 report	В  ожидании бури: Южный Кавказ	 [Waiting	 for	 the	 Storm:	 the	 South	 Caucasus],	
ed. К. Макиенко,	Моscow 2018	(in this	report	referred	to	as	KM).	The author	also	used	the	SIPRI	


























billion,	 or	 US$4400	 per capita).	 The  armed	 forces	 of	 Azerbaijan	 number	





pared	 to	US$1.61  billion	 in  2018	 and	US$1.55  billion	 in  2017);	 in	 the	 case	 of	
Armenia	it	was	US$530 million	in 2019	(compared	to	US$506 million	in 2018	
and	US$435 million	 in  2017).	Yet	 the	 amount	 that	Azerbaijan	 spends	on	de‑
fence	makes	almost	60%	of	Armenia’s	entire	national	budget,	which	in 2019	
equalled	US$3.16 billion	dollars.140	According	 to	an announcement	made	by	




































The military potentials of Armenia  
and the Nagorno ‑Karabakh Republic
Armenia’s	 land	 forces	 have	 a maximum	 of	 220  tanks	 (KM)	 at	 its	 disposal.	
Most	 of	 them	are	modernised	Soviet T‑72s	 (according	 to	MB,	Armenia	has	




(with	4  launchers),	Elbrus	(with	8  launchers)	and	Tochka‑U (with	4  launch‑
ers).	Armenia	also	has	long	‑range	surface	‑to	‑air	missile	systems	(S‑300PT	and	
S‑300PS)	as	well	as	medium	‑range	surface	‑to	‑air	missile	systems	(Krug,	Dvina,	
Buk)	 and	 short	‑range	 surface	‑to	‑air	missile	 systems	 (Kub,	 Pechora  –	MB).	
Since 2017	it	has	purchased	(on loan)	from	Russia	a Smerch	multiple	rocket	
launcher	together	with	ammunition,	an Avrobaza‑M	electronic	 intelligence	




as	well	as	4  to	6 Albatros	 jet	 trainers	and	30 to	50 helicopters	(mainly	Mi‑8	
and Mi‑24).	According	to	KM,	Armenia	also	has	14 MiG‑29 fighter	jets.
141	 As mentioned	 above,	 according	 to	 the  2018	 Convention	 on	 the	 Legal	 Status	 of	 the	 Caspian	 Sea,	















Discussing the military equipment of the NKR, MB claims that in part it could 
formally belong to Armenia (for more on the relations between Armenia and 
the para ‑state see the main part of this report). It includes T‑55 and T‑71 tanks, 
BMP‑1, BMP‑2 and BRDM‑2 armoured fighting vehicles, 122mm and 152mm 
self ‑propelled howitzers, Konkurs and Shturm wire ‑guided anti ‑tank missile 
systems, Elbrus ballistic missile systems.
Russia as the main arms supplier to both sides of the conflict
The armies of Armenia and Azerbaijan – like all their state structures – were 
created under conditions of military conflict. Initially, they took weapons 
(by different means) from Soviet Army warehouses located on both republics’ 
territories. According to an interpretation that was popular at the beginning 
of the 1990s, one of the reasons for the brutal pacification of Baku on 20 Janu‑
ary 1990 (see the main part of this report) was the seizure of a large amount 
of armaments which was not authorised by the Soviet military command.
Following the agreements on the division of the Soviet military forces (the most 
important such agreement, which formed the basis for the establishment of 
the national armies in the former Soviet republics, was signed on  14 Febru‑
ary 1992), Russia transferred 220 tanks to both Armenia and Azerbaijan, and 
a similar number of armoured fighting vehicles, as well as 285 artillery units, 
aircraft and helicopters. In spring 1992, Azerbaijan took over the post ‑Soviet 
ammunition depots in Agdam (around 1000 railway cars overall, with artillery 
ammunition and small arms such as bullets) which helped significantly during 
its summer offensive.
After Abulfaz Elchibey and the Popular Front of Azerbaijan came to power, 
Azerbaijan started to distance itself from Russia and the post ‑Soviet inte‑
gration structures. It did not sign the Collective Security Treaty (concluded 
in Tashkent on  15 May  1992), nor did it ratify the Charter of the CIS. This 
change in Baku’s foreign policy led to Moscow’s support for Armenia during 
the Nagorno ‑Karabakh conflict (see the main text of this report), which was 
proven by Russia’s supply of arms to Armenia and Russian air force support 
for Armenian operations in Nagorno ‑Karabakh (information about this sup‑
port started to emerge in early autumn 1992). Reports released by international 
organisations stated that the Armenian offensive in February 1993 was manned 
by divisions of ‘unclear state provenance’, which in practice meant they came 
from Armenia and Russia. Russian troops also supported Armenian forces in 
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CSTO  –	 the	Collective	 Security	Treaty	Organisation	 (Russian:	Организация 
Договора о коллективной безопасности – ОДКБ,	ODKB),	an intergovernmen‑
tal	military	 alliance	 currently	 comprising	 six	CIS	 states	 (Armenia,	Belarus,	
Kazakhstan,	Kyrgyzstan,	Russia	and	Tajikistan).
DCFTA –	the	Deep	and	Comprehensive	Free	Trade	Areas,	an agreement	con‑
cluded	 between	 the	European	Union	 and	 three	Eastern	Partnership	 states:	
Ukraine,	Moldova	and	Georgia.
EaP  –	 the	Eastern	Partnership,	an EU	Eastern	Policy	programme	operating	
within	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 European	 Neighbourhood	 Policy,	 which	was	














































































Former Shaumyan district and part of the former Khanlar district
of the Azerbaijan SSR
Border of former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast
Roads linking Yerevan with Stepanakert and the Iranian border* Former exclaves (not all are marked)
Main railroads in the South Caucasus
Defunct section of railroad linking Baku and Yerevan
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